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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the impact of containment and closure poli-
cies amid the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor market. We show that these
effects depend on the presence of labor uncertainty. In the absence of labor
uncertainty, the containment and closure policy resulted in people applying
fewer self-protection measures, facing lower income and saving more. We
predict that workers will lose their job as a consequence of this policy if
and only if the containment elasticity of labor demand is sufficiently large.
By contrast, when labor uncertainty is introduced, our model predicts more
self-protection, more job loss and fewer savings as a result of a lockdown.
In addition, income loss occurs if and only if the elasticity of labor demand
is large enough. We test our predictions by employing new survey data
collected on representative samples across 6 countries: China, Japan, South
Korea, Italy, the UK, and the U.S. The survey collected information from
households about their work and living situations and their income and
socio-demographic characteristics. We find that young, low-income workers
and urban dwellers are more vulnerable to containment and closure policies
as they are more likely to lose their jobs and income. More importantly, our
data provides supporting evidence to all of the predictions of our model.
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1 Introduction
From January 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on
nearly every aspect of society. As of August 2020, more than 20 million cases of
COVID-19 have been recorded, in addition to three-quarters of a million deaths
(Worldometer, 2020). In order to stop the spread of this disease, a wide range
of containment and closure policies were, and continue to be, imposed by gov-
ernments across the world to various degrees. While these policies aim to limit
movements of people to reduce the virus infection rate, they can result in signif-
icant economic costs. In this paper, we consider several important effects of the
pandemic and the containment policies on the labor market. In particular, we
ask the following questions: Who are likely to lose their jobs? How do contain-
ment policies affect people’s jobs? How do people react to the pandemic and the
containment policies?
In this paper we propose a simple extension of standard precautionary savings
framework to quantify the impact of the pandemic and containment policies
on the labor market. Our model has two important building blocks: one for
the dynamics of contagion, and one for consumption and production, including
containment strategies such as the decision to work from home. The dynamics
of contagion are based on the classic epidemiology model, namely the SIR model
proposed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). The population is divided into
groups of Susceptible (S), Infected (I), and Recovered (R) people. Infected people
transmit the virus to susceptible people at a rate that depends on the nature of
the virus and the frequency of social interactions. The economic side of the model
focuses on two key decisions: consumption and labor supply. We use a standard
model where members of large households jointly make these decisions.
Our model enables us to study the reactions of households in response to
the outbreak and containment policies of the government. In particular, the
household maximizes its utility over two periods. In the first period, it decides on
its level of consumption and of protective measures that the household will take
against the virus. These measures will reduce the virus infection rate, which then
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determines the supply of labor in the next period. In addition, the demand for
labor in the second period depends on the containment policies of the government
and some demand shocks.
Our model makes a clear distinction of the outcomes with and without la-
bor uncertainty. In the benchmark model, we assume that containment policies
are the only factor in the labor demand function. Under this set-up, we show
that people apply fewer protective measures in the presence of more stringent
containment policies. We also show that there will be higher levels of unemploy-
ment if the containment elasticity of labor is large enough. This is because, in
addition to the direct effect of containment policies on labor demand, there is
an indirect effect of containment policies on the labor market. Indeed, the lower
self-protection measures as a result of the containment policies reduces the num-
ber of people actively seeking jobs. This reduces unemployment. We call this
the indirect effect of containment policies. When the containment elasticity of
labor demand is large, the direct effect dominates the indirect one. We also show
that people lose income and save more to compensate for this loss of income in
response to containment policies.
Very interesting results arise when we introduce labor uncertainty into the
model. Indeed, people might have to work from home to avoid the risk of disease
transmission. However, the extent to which people work from home is not known.
This is an example of a demand shock that can be introduced. We also assume
that people are prudent, i.e. they make an effort to reduce the probability of the
risks that they face. Under this setting, we find that most of our initial results
reverse. In particular, we now find that containment policies induce more self-
protection measures. This is because containment policies reduce future income,
which consequently increases the marginal value of wealth among risk-averse
people. As a result, prudent people seem to want to protect themselves more
in this scenario. Containment policies also have various impacts on the labor
market: the unemployment rate is always higher, while household savings are
lower than without the policies.
We then tested our predictions using data collected during the initial months
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of the pandemic. We employ two main datasets. The first is a survey conducted in
April 2020. In the survey, people were asked a number of questions regarding their
socio-demographic characteristics and the outcomes of their jobs, income and
savings during the pandemic. The second dataset is a collection of government
policy responses during the pandemic. To capture the policy heterogeneity across
countries, we construct a number of indices based on criteria such as how early
and swiftly the government reacted to the pandemic. By merging these two
datasets we are able to quantify the effects of the pandemic and the containment
policies imposed by the governments.
Our data reveals that young workers were more likely to experience job loss
than others. In addition, low earners were more vulnerable than high earners.
As a result, both their income and expected income decreased. These results
are consistent with what has been found in other studies (Beland, Brodeur and
Wright 2020; Joyce and Xu 2020).
More importantly, our data provides evidence to support our predictions. By
using the variation in the households’ expectations of future income losses, we are
able to separate the regions according to their level of labor uncertainty. In the
regions in which the variation is low (i.e. labor uncertainty is absent), the effect
of containment measures on job loss is insignificant. According to our model,
this effect depends on whether the direct effect of containment measures (i.e.
containment leading to lower labor demand) dominates the indirect effect (i.e.
containment reduces the number of healthy people who are active job seekers).
This prediction is supported when we separate our sample into two categories:
people who were waiting to be tested for the virus and those who were not. In
the first sample, the indirect effect is strong and hence containment results in
fewer job losses. In the second sample, the indirect effect of containment policies
are weak. As a result, containment policies result in more job losses. Our model
also predicts that in the absence of uncertainty, people’s income would be lower,
savings would be higher and self-protection measures would be less utilised. All
of these predictions are supported by our data.
Interestingly, we have different results when labor uncertainty is present. In
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regions where the variation of the household’s expectation of future income loss is
high, we find that the rate of job loss is higher with stricter containment policies.
Higher levels of income loss occur with the sample of people not waiting to be
tested because the indirect effect of containment policies are weak. People save
less but apply more self-protection measures. All these results support our initial
predictions.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related
literature. We then present out model in Section 3. Our data and empirical
strategy are introduced in Sections 4 and 5. We discuss our results in Section 6
and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related literature
There is a fast-growing body of literature that applies an epidemiology model
to analyse the impact of the crisis. Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020)
applied the SIR model to investigate the macroeconomic impacts of the pandemic.
They showed that in response to the disastrous effects of the pandemic, people
reduced their consumption and economic activity. These demand and supply
forces, while helping to stop the spread of the virus, brought the economy into a
major recession. Atkeson (2020) also used this framework to simulate the spread
of the virus under various scenarios. Toxvaerd (2020) applied this model to pin
down social distancing in equilibrium while Acemoglu et al. (2020) looked for the
optimal containment policy when different groups of people had various levels of
risk when exposed to the virus.
Our paper joins the growing body of literature on the impacts of the pan-
demic on the labor market. Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2020) warned
that the impact was larger than shown in the unemployment claims. Job va-
cancies collapsed at a magnitude similar to the Great Depression (Kahn, Lange
and Wiczer 2020). These effects were larger for occupations that required more
inter-personal contact (Montenovo et al. 2020). The pandemic has also dispro-
portionately affected other vulnerable groups. Platt and Warwick (2020) show
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that, in the UK, ethnic minorities are more economically vulnerable to the cur-
rent crisis than the white British majority. Beland, Brodeur and Wright (2020)
show that men and young workers are more likely to be affected by the pandemic.
Joyce and Xu (2020) add that low-earners and women were more likely to work
in the sectors most negatively impacted by the pandemic. Andrew et al. (2020)
show that workers with children face immense pressure from the crisis, due to
the lack of childcare available. Borjas and Cassidy (2020) suggest that the shock
was more severe for immigrant workers in the early stages of the pandemic.
Additionally, we contribute to the emerging literature that investigates the
impacts of containment policies. Brodeur et al. (2020) use Google Trends data
and found that containment policies have resulted in higher levels of mental
health issues as more people face boredom, loneliness, anxiety and sadness.
Glover et al. (2020) look at the distributional effects of containment policies
while Rampini (2020) proposes lifting containment policies sequentially to al-
low the less vulnerable share of the population, who have a higher labour force
participation rate, to resume their economic activity.
We build on existing literature that looks at optimal prevention policies in
the presence of prudence. In addition to risk aversion, which is well-known in the
economic-finance literature, Kimball (1990) introduce the notion of “prudence”
to measure the sensitivity of a decision variable (effort) to risk. Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (2005) then analyse the link between prevention and prudence. They
show that prudence reduces prevention. Courbage and Rey (2006) extend this
research further by showing that people who have a fear of sickness (i.e. their
loss of sickness is large enough) only pursue more prevention if they are less
prudent (Courbage and Rey 2006). Contrary to these one-period models where
prevention and its effects occur simultaneously, our setting is a two-period model
in which the effect of prevention is only realized in the future. In this setting,
however, prudence increases prevention efforts (Menegatti 2009; Courbage and
Rey 2012). In these papers, the marginal value of wealth, a key variable that
dictates the level of prevention effort, does not change. A novel feature in our
model is that this variable varies with the stringency of a containment policy.
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Finally, we relate our paper to the literature that studies the “new normal” in
the labour market, namely working from home. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic
has led to more people working remotely (Brynjolfsson et al. 2020). However,
the ability to work from home varies with occupation and socio-demographic
characteristics. Only 37% of jobs in the U.S. can be done from home (Dingel
and Neiman 2020). People in the US who work from home are likely to be white
with a college degree and a stable well-paid job (Mongey and Weinberg 2020).
Finally, according to Jones, Philippon and Venkateswaran (2020), people make
the decision to work from home based on their fear of infection and expected
level of hospital congestion. On the one hand, working from home helps reduce
one’s risk of getting infected. On the other hand, by getting infected early and
developing immunity to the virus, they can avoid hospital congestion at the peak
of the pandemic.
3 Model
This section provides a theoretical framework to help interpret results from
empirical models discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Representative consumer
We consider a model in which a representative household faces a risk of being
infected with the virus. The dynamics of an epidemic are much faster than the
population dynamics of a household, assuming a constant household size. We
will assume that disease dynamics between period t and t+1 follow the standard
SIR model:
St+1 = St − ΓStIt/Nt
It+1 = It + ΓStIt/Nt −ΨIt
Rt+1 = Rt + ΨIt
S0, I0, N0 > 0 with N0 = S0 + I0
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where St is the number of susceptible individuals, It is the number of infectious
individuals, and Rt is the number of recovered or deceased individuals in period
t. The epidemiology parameters are the contact rate Γ and the recovery rate Ψ
from the disease. As we have sampled representative households, the proportion
of the household in each disease status mirrors that of the population. In other
words, we have st =
St
N , it =
It
N and rt =
Rt
N .
From the laws of motion in the SIR model we get:
s1 = s0 − Γi0s0 (1)
i1 = i0 + Γi0s0 −Ψi0 (2)
r1 = Ψi0. (3)
and thus the fraction of healthy individuals is
s1 + r1 = s0 − Γi0s0 + Ψi0.
After presenting the epidemic modeling SIR model, we then incorporate it
into a standard precautionary savings framework (Eaton and Rosen 1980; Eeck-
houdt, Gollier and Schlesinger 2005). Our main emphasis is to analyze how the
pandemic and containment policies affect labor market outcomes. For this pur-
pose, we consider a containment policy that mitigates the effects of the pandemic
by limiting social interaction. This policy has an indirect effect of having to shut-
down some non-essential sectors, which results in a lower demand for labor.
In our model a representative household lives for two periods. In period 0,
the household anticipates an outbreak that could occur in period 1. They know
the fraction of healthy and infected individuals in their household, which are s0
and i0, respectively. Given an income level y0, they choose consumption in each
period C0, C1, the self-protection measures Q, savings S and labor supply for the
next period.
8
3.2 Lockdown policy and self-protection
In response to the pandemic, the government applies a containment policy
with a level of stringency z in period 1. This containment policy indirectly affects
the labor supply of the household. We assume that infected people are unable
to work. The labor supplied by healthy people is given by:
L(z, ε) = B(z, ε)(s1 + r1), 0 ≤ B(z, ε) ≤ 1. (4)
In the above equation, s1 + r1 is the total supply of labor in the household.
B(z, ε) is the demand for labor. This depends on the containment policy z,
as mentioned above. There is also an unknown demand factor ε that we will
elaborate on in the subsequent section.
When people take more measures for self-protection, they are less likely to
get infected with the disease. To capture this effect, we endogenize the contact
rate as a function of protective measures Q. Following Goenka, Liu and Nguyen




≥ 0. Admittedly, when more
self-protection is applied people are less likely to get infected and more likely
to recover from the diseases. Furthermore, the marginal effect diminishes with
these measures.
We will take the consumption good as the numeraire and denote p the price
of protection. Then, the budget constraint in period 0 is given by:
y0 = C0 + pQ+ S.
And the budget constraint in period 1 is:
C1 = (1 + r)S + y1 (5)
where r is the interest rate. Similar to the interest rate, wage w is fixed in this
partial equilibrium. In period 1, the household receives their income from labor,
which is given by:
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y1 = wL(z, ε).
From Equations (1), (4) and (5) we have:
C1 = (1 + r)S + wB(z, ε)(s0 − Γ(Q)i0s0 + Ψi0)
= (1 + r)(y0 − C0 − pQ) + wB(z, ε)(s0 − Γ(Q)i0s0 + Ψi0).
The household maximizes its utility, given all relevant constraints. Assuming




U(C0) + EV (C1). (6)
The utility functions U and V are assumed to be strictly concave, i.e., (U ′ >
0, V ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, V ′′ < 0). This implies that the household is a risk-averse
agent. If interior solutions exist, the first-order conditions read:
U ′(C0)− (1 + r)EV ′(C1) = 0,
E{V ′(C1)(p(1 + r) + wB(z, ε)s0i0Γ′(Q))} = 0.
Denoting x by x = 1 + r the gross return on savings, at the optimum we
have:
U ′(y0 − S − pQ) = xE{V ′(xS + wB(z, ε)(s0 − Γ(Q)i0s0 + Ψi0))}. (7)
E{V ′(C1)(px+ wB(z, ε)s0i0Γ′(Q))} = 0. (8)
The FOC (7) shows the trade-off between consumption in periods 0 and 1.
The FOC (8) illustrates the cost and benefit of self-protection measures. In
particular, taking more measures reduces consumption expenditure. However, it
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also reduces the household’s contact rate, which then increases labor income.
3.3 Risk-averse agent
We first consider a simple case where there is no labor uncertainty, i.e.,
B(z, ε) = B(z). The impact of containment policies is one of the main con-
cerns of our analysis. It is, therefore, important to explain how we incorporate
containment policies into our model. In particular, because of the restrictions
imposed by these policies, certain sectors have to close down or reduce their op-
erations. As a result, a large fraction θ(z) of healthy individuals will be laid-off.
Therefore, we have:
B(z) = 1− θ(z) (9)
From now on, if there is no confusion, we will denote fx as the partial deriva-
tive of the function f with respect to the variable x. We can now rewrite the
amount of labor supplied by the household as:
L(z) = (1− θ(z))(s1 + r1) = (1− θ(z))(s0 − Γi0s0 + Ψi0), (10)
We can then make the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the absence of labor uncertainty, more stringent policies result
in:
(i) fewer protective measures. (ii) more (less) loss of jobs if the containment
policy elasticity of labor demand is high (low),
(iii) more loss of income,
(iv) more savings,
(v) ambiguous effect on consumption,
Proof
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(i) To simplify notation, we denote
G(z) = px+ w(1− θ(z))s0i0Γ′(Q).
Thus,
Gz = −wθzs0i0Γ′(Q) + w(1− θ)s0i0Γ′′(Q)Qz (11)
where Gz and Qz the partial derivatives of G and Q with respect to z. The FOCs
(7) and (8) become
U ′(y0 − pQ− S) = xV ′(xS + y1(z)) (12)
G(z)V ′(xS + y1(z)) = 0 (13)
It follows from (13) that G(z) = 0 for all levels of stringency z, since V ′(.) > 0






Qz < 0 follows from θz > 0,Γ
′ < 0 and Γ
′′
> 0.
(ii) The amount of job loss is defined as:
J(z) = θ(z)(s1 + r1) = θ(z)(1− i0 − s0i0Γ(Q(z)) + Ψi0)
If we take the derivative of the job loss function with respect to the stringency
level, we have:
Jz = θz(1− i1)− θ(z)s0i0Γ′Qz.
In the above formula, we can see two effects of a containment policy. On
one hand, it results in more people being laid-off. On the other hand, it induces
people to apply fewer protective measures (Result i), which reduces the number
of healthy people in the population. As a result, there are fewer people actively
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seeking jobs. In other words, unemployment drops by definition.
The overall effect of a containment policy, therefore, depends on which effect
is the dominant one. In particular, if labor demand is very elastic to the con-
tainment policy ( θzθ >
s0i0Γ′Qz
1−i1 ) then a more stringent policy results in more job
losses.
(iii) Denote ∆ the loss of labor income. There are two reasons the household
experiences income loss. First, infected people are unable to work, and hence
lose their income. Second, healthy people are laid-off because of the containment
policy. We can, therefore, write the income loss as:
∆ = w(i1 + θ(s1 + r1)) = w(i1 + θ(1− i1))
= w(θ + i1(1− θ)) = w[θ + (i0 + s0i0Γ−Ψi0)(1− θ)].
In the formula above, we apply the SIR model (1). Taking the derivative of
this income loss with respect to the stringency level, we have:
∆z = w[(θz + s0i0QzΓ
′(1− θ)− (i0 + s0i0Γ−Ψi0)θz]
= w[(θz(1− i1) + s0i0QzΓ′(1− θ)].
Given that θz > 0, Qz < 0,Γ
′ < 0, we have:
∆z ≥ 0.
From y1 = wL(z) we can derive the effect of containment policy on labor





(1− i1)θz + (1− θ)i0s0Γ′Qz
)
< 0
(iv) If we take the derivative of both sides of Equation (12) with respect to
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z, we have:












U ′′ + x2V ′′
> 0
because Qz < 0,
∂y1
∂z < 0.















U ′′ + x2V ′′
The effect of a containment policy on current consumption C0 comes from
two sources. On the one hand, people faced with such restrictions tend to apply
fewer protective measures. On the other hand, they are also likely to save more
to protect themselves against the loss of income in the next period. Therefore,
whether or not current consumption increases (decreases) in response to contain-










U ′′ + x2V ′′
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As a result, the effect of a containment policy on consumption in period 1 is
also ambiguous.
3.4 Prudent agent with labor uncertainty
In the previous section, we assume labor demand is only affected by contain-
ment policies. However, the pandemic can also bring shocks to the structure of
the labor market. For instance, people may decide to work remotely to avoid
the risk of being infected. The extent to which people work from home can be
considered a labor demand shock.
Formally, we reconsider the demand for labor B(z, ε). In the previous model,
∂B
∂ε = 0. Here, we extend the model by allowing
∂B
∂ε to be different from 0. More
precisely, let us consider a particular form of B(z, ε), where B(z, ε),= 1−θ(z)+ε
. This assumption implies the random demand shock ε changes the labor supply
rate but leaves marginal demand for labor intact. Thus, Bz is independent from
ε. Recall that in the benchmark case we have Bz < 0.
In the previous set-up, the utility function is concave. This implies that our
agent is risk-averse. Here, we assume further that the utility in period 1, V ,
is a decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) model. A DARA model implies
a positive third derivative. It means that −V
′′(C)
V ′(C) = R(C) is decreasing in C.
A positive third derivative of a utility function leads to precautionary savings
(Kimball 1990; Gollier 2001). This implies that the agent is prudent (Eeckhoudt
and Gollier 2005). In other words, not only does the agent not like uncertainty
(risk-aversion), they also prepare themselves against such risk.
Denote the number of healthy people in the household in period 1 by
H(Q) = s0 − Γ(Q)i0s0 + Ψi0,= s1 + r1
We then rewrite the labor income in period 1 as well as the function G as
below:
y1(z, ε) = w(1− θ(z, ε) + β(z))(s− Γ(Q)is+ Ψi) = wB(z, ε)H(Q),
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The FOC (7) becomes:
U ′(y0 − S − pQ) = xE{V ′(xS + y1)}. (15)
Note that from budget constraint in period 0, Cz = −pQz−Sz. Differentiating
the FOCs (15)-(8) with respect to z yields:
(pQz + Sz)U








Replacing G = px+wBs0i0Γ






′′ + xE{(wBzH + wBH ′Qz + xSz)V ′′} = 0






We rearrange the terms and have that:
(U ′′ + x2EV′′)Sz + (U ′′p+ xwE{BH ′V ′′})Qz = −xwE{BzHV ′′}
















′′ + x2EV ′′
b12 = U
′′p+ xwE{BH ′V ′′}
b21 = xE{GV
′′}
















where b11b22 − (b12)b21 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of problem
(6), and by the concavity assumption it is positive.
The following proposition shows that the presence of labor uncertainty plays
a key role in labor market outcomes as well as the behavior of individuals.
Proposition 2 In the presence of uncertainty, containment policies lead to:
(i) more self-protection measures.
(ii) more unemployment,
(iii) more(less) income loss if θz is large(small),
(iv) fewer savings,
(v) ambiguous effects on consumption.
Proof.
(i) Since the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive, the sign of Qz is
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that of b11d2 − b21d1 which can be expanded as:
b11d2 − b21d1 =− (U ′′ + x2EV ′′)(wE{BzHGV
′′
+Bzs0i0Γ




′V ′})− x2wEV ′′E{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′}
=− U ′′wE{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′} − x2wEV ′′E{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′} − U ′′wE{BzHGV
′′}
Note that Bz < 0,Γ
′ < 0, V ′ > 0, U ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0, U ′′ < 0 by assumption,
therefore:
− U ′′wE{BzsiΓ′V ′} − x2w2EV ′′E{BzsiΓ′V ′} > 0. (16)
If U ′′wE{BzHGV
′′} is negative, then we can conclude that Qz is also positive.
Let us denote ε∗ such that G(ε∗) = px + wB(z, ε∗)s0i0Γ
′(Q) = 0. Note that
Gε(ε) = ws0i0Γ
′(Q) < 0., i.e. G is a decreasing function of the labor demand
shock ε. Therefore G(ε) > 0 if ε < ε∗ and G(ε) ≤ 0 if ε ≥ ε∗.




decreasing in C1. Furthermore, we have
∂C1(ε)








Hence R(C1(ε)) is decreasing in ε. If ε ≤ ε∗ we have R(C1(ε)) ≥ R(C1(ε∗) and if
ε > ε∗ we have R(C1(ε)) < R(C1(ε
∗).
This, in addition to the fact that G(ε) is positive (negative) if ε is smaller
(larger) than ε∗, we have:
[R(C1(ε))−R(C1(ε∗))]G(ε) ≥ 0.
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⇒−G(ε)V ′′(C1) ≥ R(C1(ε∗))G(ε)V ′(C1)
Multiplying both sides by the negative term BzH we have:
−BzHG(ε)V ′′(C1) ≤ BzHR(C1(ε∗))G(ε)V ′(C1)
Taking expectations:
−EBzHG(ε)V ′′(C1) ≤ R(C1(ε∗))BzHEG(ε)V ′(C1).
Recall that EG(ε)V ′(C1) = 0 from Equation(8), hence:
EBzHG(ε)V ′′(C1) ≥ 0 (17)
This together with (16) implies that:
Qz ≥ 0.
Recall that in the previous set-up without labor uncertainty and risk-averse
agent, containment policies induce fewer self-protection measures. Here, when we
introduce labor uncertainty with a prudent agent, we have a completely opposite
prediction: containment policies tend to induces more self-protection measures.
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) shows that prudence tends to reduce self-protection
in a one-period model. However, in the case of a two-period model, the opposite
result is found (Menegatti 2009). The key difference between the two models is
that while in a one-period model self-protection measures and its effects occur
simultaneously, in a two-period model the agents only witness the effects of their
self-protection measures in the subsequent period. Our model is more similar to
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Menegatti (2009) in this regard than to Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005).
To understand the intuition of these results, note that the prudent agent
makes more of an effort to increase his wealth in the period where he bears the
risk. In a one-period model, prudence increases the marginal value of wealth.
As self-protection and gaining wealth take place simultaneously, the agent is less
willing to spend more on self-protection to preserve his wealth. However, in a
two-period model, self-protection takes place in the first period and therefore
only its effects, not the actual amount spent on it, impact the agent’s wealth in
period 1, the period in which they bear the risk.
In our model, containment policies reduce the labor income in period 1, which
in turn increases the marginal value of wealth since the utility in this period is
concave. Therefore when containment is imposed, the prudent agent will apply
more self-protection measures.
(ii) The above proof shows that Qz is positive. It implies directly that:
Jz = θz(1− i1)− θ(z)s0i0Γ′Qz > 0.
Recall that in the absence of a labor demand shock, containment policies
result in job loss if the containment elasticity of labor demand is large enough.
Here, when we introduce a labor demand shock, we have a more clear-cut result:
containment policies always result in job loss. This is because
(iii) The marginal change in income loss with respect to the stringency level
is given by:
∆z = w[(θz(1− i1) + s0i0(1− θ)QzΓ′].
As opposed to the previous case without a labor demand shock, we now have
Qz > 0. As a result, the sign of ∆z depends on the containment elasticity of






(iv) The sign of Sz is the same as the sign of the difference between b22d1 and
b12d2, which can be rewritten as:
= −wE{GBH ′V ′′ +Bs0i0Γ′′V ′}xwE{BzHV ′′}
+ (U ′′p+ xwE{BH ′V ′′})wE{BzHGV ′′ +Bzs0i0Γ′V ′}
= −xw2E{Bs0i0Γ′′V ′}E{BzHV ′′}+ U ′′pwE{BzHGV ′′ +Bzs0i0Γ′V ′}
+ xw2E{BH ′V ′′}E{Bs0i0Γ′V ′}
= −xw2E{Bs0i0Γ′′V ′}E{BzHV ′′}+ wE{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′}(U ′′p+ xwE{BH ′V ′′}) + wpU ′′E{BzHGV
′′}
Note that E{Bs0i0Γ′′V ′} > 0,E{BzHV ′′} > 0,E{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′} > 0,E{BH ′V ′′} <
0 and E{BzHGV
′′} > 0 because Bz < 0,Γ′ < 0,Γ′′ > 0, V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0, H ′ =
−Γ′s0i0 > 0 by assumptions. As a result, −xw2E{Bs0i0Γ′′V ′}E{BzHV ′′} <
0, wE{Bzs0i0Γ′V ′}(U ′′p + xwE{BH ′V ′′}) < 0 and wpU ′′E{BzHGV
′′} < 0. In
other words, as all the components of b22d1 − b12d2 are negative, Sz is also neg-
ative.
(v) As Cz = −pQz −Sz, the effect of containment policies on consumption is
ambiguous in the case with uncertainty.
4 Data
4.1 Survey data
To understand the behaviors and the outcomes of individuals during the pan-
demic, we employed the survey data from Belot et al. (2020). Data was collected
between April 15 and April 23 with the support of market research companies:
Lucid for Western countries (Italy, UK and US), and dataSpring for Asian coun-
tries (China, Japan and Korea). This survey contains information about basic
demographic characteristics and the impact of the pandemic on the respondents’
jobs and incomes.
Table 1 summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents.
We can see that all age categories and income quantiles are well represented in this
survey. There could be, however, an over-representation of self-employed workers
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in the sample, representing more than 44% of the total sample, with part-time
and full-time employees representing 13% and 11% of the sample, respectively.
The survey measured the impacts of the pandemic on the labor market using
a number of measures. First, it asked if respondents had lost their jobs as a
consequence of the pandemic. The respondents could respond with three options:
lost their job permanently (1), temporarily (2) or not at all (3). In other words,
the higher the answer, the more secure the job. The loss of employment indicator
was accompanied by a question about loss of income. Respondents were asked
how much their typical household income was reduced as a result of the pandemic.
The survey also asked respondents if they expected a loss of income in the future.
All of this information was used to calculate a measure of workers’ vulnerability
during the crisis.
Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics
Age Distribution
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66-75 Above 75
12% 18% 19% 19% 16% 13% 4%
Income Distribution
1st quantile 2nd quantile 3rd quantile 4th quantile 5th quantile
19% 18% 21% 22% 18%
Labor status
Self-employed Part time Full time
44% 13% 11%
4.2 Lockdown policy
We used the index provided by Hale et al. (2020) for our government policy
response data. To create this index, they used the Oxford COVID-19 Govern-
ment Response Tracker (OxCGRT), which is a systematic cross-national, cross-
temporal measure to understand how government responses have evolved with
the spread of the virus. They tracked a number of government policies, from con-
tainment and closure, to economic responses and healthcare systems. Using the
Principle Component Analysis, they created a single index that aims to quantify
the stringency of government policies.
Figure 1 shows the stringency index overtime in the six countries in our anal-
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ysis: China, Italy, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom and United States.
The first dashed line indicates when the country had 100 confirmed cases, often
regarded as the beginning of the spread of the virus in the country. The sec-
ond dashed line indicates the time the survey took place. We can see that the
policy trajectory was different across countries and that there is a variation of ap-
proaches across countries. The containment level taken is the level of stringency
from the start of the spread of the virus.
5 Empirical identification
5.1 Demand labor shock
Our theory makes a clear distinction between the case with a labor demand
shock and the case without it. Indeed, our predictions of protective measures,
job losses, income and savings all depend on the presence of labor demand shock.
To match our empirical exercise with our theoretical model, we need a mea-
sure of labor demand shock. In our survey, respondents were asked whether they
expected a loss in household income. The standard deviation of their answers is
used as a measure of the extent of the labor demand shock. The labor demand
shock for each region is provided in the Appendix (Table A1).
Figure 2 shows the shocks across different regions in our survey. We can see
there is a variation of shocks, which helps us empirically investigate the impact
of containment policies on key variables. In particular, we will classify that the
region had (did not have) a labor demand shock if the standard deviation is
higher (lower) than 0.49, which is the mean of the standard deviation in this
sample. Following this classification, 30 percent of the respondents lived in areas



























































































































































































































































































Figure 1. The stringency of the lockdown policy across countries. The first
dashed line on each graph shows the date of the hundredth confirmed case in
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Labor demand shock
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0013
Kernel density estimate
Figure 2. Kernel density of the regional labor demand shock. The labor
demand shock is measured as the standard deviation of the respondents’
expectation that they would face a loss in income in the next six months.
5.2 The impact of containment on the job outcomes
Our theory predicts that job loss J(z) is a function of the level of stringency
of a containment policy. In addition to this policy, we assume that J(.) is also
a function of the characteristics (e.g. age, gender, race, income level, etc.) of
the workers. In particular, we will have J(z,X), where X is a vector of the
characteristics.
To match our theory with the survey data, we further assume that a household
member will not be classified as having lost their job if the job loss J is lower
than a certain threshold j1. If J(.) is in between j1 and j2, then the job loss is
classified as only temporary. Finally, if J(.) is above the threshold j2 then the
job is loss is classified as permanent. In particular, we have:
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e = 3(no job loss) if J < j1
= 2(job loss temporarily) if j1 ≤ J < j2
= 1(job loss permanently) if j2 ≤ J
where ei is the observed employment status of the household. Together with
the fact that J(.) is a function of the containment policy z and household char-
acteristics X we can write our regression as:
f(eci) = α+ Γ ∗Xci + βPc + uci (18)
where Xci is a vector of the respondent’s demographic characteristics and Pc
is a vector of the containment policies in country c, where that respondent lives.
According to this model we have:
Pr(ei = 3|Xci, Pc) = Pr(Ji < j1|Xci, Pc) = F (j1)
Pr(ei = 2|Xci, Pc) = Pr(j1 ≤ Ji < j2|Xci, Pc) = F (j2)− F (j1)
Pr(ei = 1|Xci, Pc) = Pr(j2 ≤ Ji|Xci, Pc) = 1− F (j2)
(19)
where F (.) is the cumulative distribution function of uci. If we assume uci
follows a standard normal distribution then we have a ordinal probit regression.
If we assume uci follows a logistic distribution then we have a ordinal logit re-
gression. As a result, the function f(.) of Equation 18 represents the logit and
probit functions.
5.3 The impact of containment on income, savings and protec-
tive measures
In the previous section, we laid out the identification strategy to empirically
analyse the impact of containment policies on job outcomes. This identification
strategy can be applied to other outcomes such as income, savings and self-
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protection measures. More precisely, if we denote y∗ as the respondent’s answers
to the changes in their income, savings and self-protection measures we have:
f(y∗ci) = α+ Γ ∗Xci + βPc + uci (20)
6 Empirical evidence
6.1 Vulnerable workers
Table 2 highlights the characteristics of vulnerable workers during the pan-
demic. In particular, young workers were more vulnerable than senior ones.
Relative to people aged between 18 and 25 years old, senior workers (aged above
56) had a higher chance of keeping their jobs. More precisely, our probit model
predicts that senior workers aged between 56 and 65 years old were 6 percent
more likely to keep their jobs than young people (aged 18 to 25 years old)1.
Self-employed workers seem to fare better than part-timers and full-time
workers. The probit model predicts that 84 percent of self-employed workers
will keep their jobs, as opposed to only 65 percent of full-time workers. The
lowest-income workers (the first quintile of the income group) only have an es-
timated 75 percent chance of keeping their jobs, which is 10 percent lower than
the highest-income workers (the fifth income quintile). Finally, the job security
of urban dwellers are more vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic than ru-
ral residents. 79 percent of the former groups are predicted to keep their jobs,
compared to 84 percent of the latter group.
When people lose their job, they also experience a loss of income. In this
regard, the results reported in Table 3 are consistent with those in Table 2.
Young, employed, low-income and urban workers’ incomes are more vulnerable
to the effects of the pandemic. In particular, our probit model predicts that 67
percent of workers aged between 18 and 25 years old experience a loss of income,
compared to 59 percent of workers aged between 56 and 65 years old. 59 percent
1The probability of those between the ages of 56 and 65 keeping their jobs is 86 percent,
while it is 80 percent for young workers.
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of self-employed workers are predicted to experience income loss, compared to 81
percent of full-time workers. The proportion of the lowest and highest income
workers expected to lose their income are 71 and 63 percent, respectively. Finally,
68 percent of urban dwellers are expected to lose their income, as opposed to 62
percent of rural residents.
6.2 Impacts of containment
Our theory highlights the role of labor demand uncertainty in terms of the
impact of containment policies. Indeed, in the absence of labor uncertainty,
containment policies can result in job loss if the containment elasticity of labor
demand is sufficiently large. This leads to income loss, an increase in savings and
fewer self-protection measures being taken. In the presence of labor uncertainty,
containment policies also result in job and income loss. However, in this scenario
savings decrease and more self-protection measures are applied.
In Section 5.1 we explained our labor demand shock measure. Our prediction,
in particular whether or not household members will lose their jobs during the
containment period, depends on whether the direct effect of containment on labor
demand dominates the indirect effect of containment on the availability of the
workers. To measure this, we distinguish between the respondents who were
waiting to be tested for the virus and those who were not. Admittedly, the latter
group are likely to be healthier than the former. Therefore, the direct effect of
containment is more likely to dominate the indirect effect of containment for the
latter group than for the former.
Table 4 reports the impacts of containment on our key variables, namely
job loss, income, savings and protective measures. In the first two columns, we
present the impacts of containment in the absence of a labor demand shock. In
the last two columns, we present the impacts of containment in the presence of
a labor demand shock. As our answers are in the form of rating scales, we apply
the ordinal logit and probit regressions to our data. Ordinal logit regressions are
employed in Columns 1 and 3 while ordinal probit regressions are employed in
Columns 2 and 4.
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Table 2. Impact of demographic characteristics on the labor market
(1) (2)
Between 26 and 35 -0.084 -0.069
(0.144) (0.083)
Between 36 and 45 -0.066 -0.048
(0.142) (0.082)
Between 46 and 55 0.133 0.082
(0.146) (0.085)
Between 56 and 65 0.378** 0.229**
(0.160) (0.093)
Between 66 and 75 0.400* 0.238*
(0.217) (0.126)
Above 75 -0.023 -0.018
(0.389) (0.230)




Prefer not to answer my gender 0.591 0.398
(1.587) (0.953)










Prefer not to answer my race -0.140 -0.051
(0.533) (0.317)
Employed part-time -0.396*** -0.217***
(0.112) (0.065)
Employed full-time -1.089*** -0.620***
(0.114) (0.066)
Second quantile 0.008 0.004
(0.141) (0.082)
Third quantile 0.271* 0.165**
(0.139) (0.081)
Fourth quantile 0.438*** 0.258***
(0.140) (0.081)
Fifth quantile 0.625*** 0.359***
(0.151) (0.087)
Prefer not to answer my income 1.025** 0.551**
(0.427) (0.235)
Semi-urban / residential 0.267*** 0.154***
(0.090) (0.052)
Country side 0.370*** 0.208***
(0.136) (0.079)
Observations 4103 4103
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether the respondent experienced a loss of job.
1 - job lost permanently, 2 - job lost temporarily, 3 - no job lost. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0129
Table 3. Impact of demographic characteristics on household income
(1) (2)
Between 26 and 35 0.026 0.018
(0.149) (0.090)
Between 36 and 45 0.046 0.026
(0.149) (0.090)
Between 46 and 55 -0.089 -0.055
(0.151) (0.091)
Between 56 and 65 -0.346** -0.209**
(0.164) (0.098)
Between 66 and 75 -0.687*** -0.414***
(0.223) (0.135)
Above 75 0.218 0.146
(0.457) (0.274)




Prefer not to answer my gender -19.872 -6.365
(7838.131) (920.517)










Prefer not to answer my race -0.449 -0.249
(0.592) (0.356)
Employed part-time 0.506*** 0.298***
(0.115) (0.069)
Employed full-time 1.064*** 0.639***
(0.131) (0.077)
Second quantile -0.111 -0.069
(0.155) (0.093)
Third quantile -0.282* -0.178*
(0.152) (0.091)
Fourth quantile -0.305** -0.191**
(0.151) (0.091)
Fifth quantile -0.341** -0.214**
(0.158) (0.096)
Prefer not to answer my income -0.848** -0.521**
(0.383) (0.230)
Semi-urban / residential -0.256*** -0.157***
(0.090) (0.055)
Country side -0.160 -0.090
(0.135) (0.082)
Observations 4103 4103
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0130
Panel A of Table 4 shows the impacts of containment on job loss. Respondents
were asked if they experienced any job loss as a consequence of the pandemic.
The answers were 1 (permanent job loss), 2 (temporary job loss) or 3 (no job loss).
We can see that in the absence of labor uncertainty (Columns 1 and 2), the effects
are insignificant. By contrast, in the presence of labor uncertainty (Columns 3
and 4), the effects are significantly negative. Table 5 provides the predicted job
outcomes based on the ordinal logit and probit models. Both models predict that
the stringency level of a containment policy increases the proportion of people
who lose their jobs.
Note that the impacts of containment on job outcomes are insignificant in the
absence of labor uncertainty (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4). Indeed, the impacts
of containment in such case depend on whether the direct effect of containment
dominates the indirect effect. Panel A of Table A1 provides evidence to support
this prediction. Indeed, the impact of containment among the people who were
waiting to be tested are insignificant. This is because the indirect effect of con-
tainment (i.e. improvements in the health outcomes of households) in this case
cancel out the direct effect. By contrast, among the people who did not need
a test, and hence the indirect effect of containment, is insignificant. In addi-
tion, the effect of containment, which is mainly the direct effect, is significantly
negative.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the impacts of containment on income. In the
absence of labor uncertainty, the impacts of containment are negative (Columns 1
and 2). This is consistent with prediction (ii) of Proposition 1. By contrast, in the
presence of labor uncertainty, the impacts of containment are positive (Columns
3 and 4). In fact, the biggest impacts occur among people who were not waiting
to be tested because the indirect effects of containment are not pronounced.
Panel C reports the impacts of containment on savings. We can see that in the
absence of labor uncertainty (Columns 1 and 2), the overall effect of containment
on savings is positive. Hence, people save more in response to the decrease in
their income. By contrast, in the presence of labor uncertainty (Columns 3 and
4) the overall effect of containment on savings is negative. All of these results
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support our initial predictions.
Finally, Panel D reports the impacts of containment on protective measures.
In our survey, the respondents were asked if they wash their hands with water and
soap, or regularly use hand sanitizer, normally (i.e. in the absence of a pandemic),
right after the initial outbreak of the virus, and at the time of the survey. We
interpreted their answers at the time of the survey to be their response to the
containment policy imposed by their government. Our model predicts that in the
absence of labor uncertainty, people apply fewer measures when containment is
stringent. These results are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel D. By contrast,
in the presence of labor uncertainty, people apply more measures, which is shown
in Columns 3 and 4.
7 Conclusion
We examined the impacts of containment policies on labor market outcomes
and the behaviors of people. We show that the role of labor uncertainty is
crucial. In the absence of this uncertainty, containment policies result in fewer
self-protection measures, more savings, and less income. They also imply more
job losses if, and only if, the containment elasticity of labor demand is large.
Certain predictions reverse when we introduce labor uncertainty. In this case,
containment policies lead to more self-protection, lower savings and higher rates
of job loss. Income loss occurs when the containment elasticity of labor demand
is sufficiently large.
We then provide supporting evidence that underpin our predictions. Using
data from a recent survey taken during the pandemic, along with a constructed
index measuring the stringency of government containment policies, we find that
young, low income and urban dwellers are the most vulnerable workers during
the pandemic. We find that they are more likely than other groups to lose their
jobs and incomes when governments enact containment measures. We also test
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Table A1. Labor Demand Shock across surveyed regions
Anhui 0.43154767 Texas 0.49626908
Liaoning 0.43723732 North West 0.49634725
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.44095856 Puglia 0.49659333
Jiangxi 0.44657609 Kansai 0.49865815
Calabria 0.45584232 Seoul 0.49879956
Chugoku 0.46396092 Guangdong 0.4988659
East of England 0.46481112 West Midlands 0.49942595
Shandong 0.46598476 Zhejiang 0.49954608
Sicilia 0.46933967 Toscana 0.49986777
Marche 0.47016233 California 0.49993849
East Midlands 0.47131726 Qinghai 0.5
Chubu 0.47138551 New York 0.50060618
Lombardia 0.47139022 Gyeonggi-do 0.50107157
Veneto 0.47278896 Incheon Metropolitan City 0.50156987
Wales 0.47395957 South East 0.501652
Sardegna 0.47395957 Busan 0.50212598
Jilin 0.4767313 Sichuan 0.50239807
Hebei 0.47889027 Gyeongsangbuk-do 0.50248551
Hubei 0.4807829 Abruzzo 0.50262469
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.48139685 Tohoku 0.50296736
Hunan 0.4825587 Shikoku 0.50361013
Jeju Island 0.48304591 Chung-cheong bukdo 0.50361013
Guizhou 0.48304591 Gyeongsangnam-do 0.50423378
Hokkaido 0.48409033 Fujian 0.50485235
Daegu Metropolitan City 0.48666427 Heilongjiang 0.5061202
North East 0.48829436 Gangwon-do 0.50636971
Piemonte 0.48842493 Shaanxi 0.50636971
Campania 0.4887197 Jeollabuk do 0.50636971
Greater London 0.48927677 Chungcheongnam-do 0.50686979
Emilia-Romagna 0.49026561 Liguria 0.50787449
Scotland 0.49131879 Daejeon 0.5085476
Henan 0.49136862 Northern Ireland 0.51075393
Shanxi 0.49136862 Basilicata 0.51234752
Kanto 0.49149734 Hainan 0.51639777
Kyushu 0.49219257 Yunnan 0.51639777
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.49236596 Gansu 0.51754916
Lazio 0.49292517 Ulsan Metropolitan City 0.52223295
Jeollanam-do 0.49327022 Umbria 0.53452247
South West 0.4950785 Molise 0.54772258
Jiangsu 0.49534553 Sejong Special Self-governing City 0.57735026
Florida 0.49607426 Valle d’Aosta 0.57735026
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